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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the congruence between party positions and voter preferences directly after 
the “third wave” of democratization in Latin America, and on its historical origins. Latin America 
displays a wide variation in the degree to which parties are anchored in society and reflect specific 
social groups. I argue that party systems that experienced ideological polarization in the early 20th 
century were set on a programmatic track and today are likely to exhibit high levels of congruence 
in the representation of their voters’ interests. In other contexts, where elites relied heavily on 
clientelistic resources to de-mobilize the citizenry when the suffrage was expanded in the first half 
of the 20th century, programmatic representation is likely to remain weak until the 1990s. These 
hypotheses are verified by combining the PELA-surveys of Latin American legislators with mass-
level survey data. The first task is to discuss how congruence between voter preferences and party 
positions should be measured, which involves not only a number of methodological and conceptual 
issues, but also questions ultimately rooted in differing normative conceptions of representation. I 
then move on to assessing empirically what constitutes the relevant dimensions of conflict in seven 
Latin American countries, and measure the quality of representation along these dimensions. The 
results not only reveal important contrasts in the congruence of representation across the seven 
countries studied, but also that these differences can be explained rather well by historical patterns 
of party system formation.  
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
The first euphoria over the unprecedented diffusion of democratic rule around the world in the 
“Third Wave” of democratization has given way to more gloomy assessments of the quality of 
democracy in many of these countries. Starting with O’Donnell’s (1994) famous warning of a new 
type of “delegative democracy”, attention has shifted from the factors explaining the transition to 
formal democratic regimes to those capable of accounting for differences in the quality of 
democracy. This paper focuses on the congruence between voters and their parliamentary 
representatives as one vital aspect of the quality of democracy (Pitkin, 1967; Dahl, 1971; Powell, 
2000; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Disch, 2011). The main purpose of 
the paper is to provide an assessment of the quality of representation in seven Latin American party 
systems for the earliest point in time for which adequate data is available. Contrary to prior studies 
by Luna and Zechmeister (2005, 2010), I do not measure congruence along theoretically determined 
issue categories, but start out by determining the politically relevant dimensions underlying party 
positions (for a similar approach, see Rivas-Perez, 2008). To measure party positions, I use the 
Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA) (see Alcántara Sáez, 2008). I then assess 
congruence by measuring the positions of party electorates along the same dimensions based on 
individual-level data from the World Values Survey (WVS).  
This paper also extends on prior work by anchoring the quantitative assessment of political 
representation in a historical cleavage account of party system formation. I derive expectations 
regarding the extent to which party competition is rooted in parties’ distinctive ideological appeals 
by analyzing party system trajectories along two critical junctures. First, where nationalized elite 
party systems developed towards the turn of the 19th and the 20th century, this triggered the 
formation of strong conservative parties. This, in turn, provided favorable preconditions for the 
formation of responsive party systems when new middle and working class parties arose, which 
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constitute the second critical juncture. While this argument is presented in more detail elsewhere 
(Bornschier, 2012), I provide a very brief recapitulation of the historical model and argue that 
historical bifurcations and sequences set party systems on distinctive tracks between the early and 
the mid-20th century, which have long-term effects on party system responsiveness.  
Because political actors may subsequently modify these historical patterns, the analysis 
should focus on the situation directly after the process of re-democratization occurred in Latin 
America as part of the Third Wave of democratization. The earliest point in time for which data is 
available are the mid-1990s, however. I include as many South American countries as possible in 
order to maximize variation in terms of my two key independent variables. Due to conceptual and 
practical constraints, I exclude the Central American and Caribbean countries: With the notable 
exception of Costa Rica, Central America’s experience with democracy is quite recent, and thus 
less strongly determined by prior episodes of open party competition (Mahoney, 2001). On the 
same grounds, I exclude Paraguay. On the other hand, following a common practice and in order to 
ensure comparability with other major historical studies, I include Mexico. Of the remaining ten 
countries, the combination of the PELA elite surveys and the WVS allows an analysis of the cases 
of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. While the lack of data for 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil is unfortunate, the countries covered by the data show some important 
variation with respect to the historical trajectories postulated above, and they encompass both cases 
where democracy was established anew in the 1980s, as well as long-established (formal) 
democracies such as Colombia and Venezuela.  
Strictly speaking, the term responsiveness implies a dynamic perspective, where parties 
adapt to evolving voter preferences, as in Soroka and Wlezien’s (2010) “thermostatic model”. In 
this paper, however, I use the terms congruence, representativeness, and responsiveness 
interchangeably (see also Achen, 1978). Although the data only allows for an assessment of the 
congruence between party positions and voter preferences, I argue that linking congruence in the 
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1990s to historical patterns of party system formation is indicative of responsiveness: If, decades 
after the formation of party systems, parties continue to mirror the preferences of their voter, despite 
the far-reaching changes in social structure and the ideological upheavals caused by the rise of the 
left, and the end of cold war after 1989, then they must clearly be responsive of evolving voter 
preferences.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss how responsive party 
systems are formed, and how programmatic responsiveness competes with another, much older type 
of linkage between parties and voters: clientelism. I then summarize the expectations based on the 
historical analysis mentioned above pertaining to the differences within my sample of countries in 
terms of the responsiveness of their party systems. In the third section, I draw on representational 
and cleavage theory to substantiate my analytical approach to the measurement of congruence. The 
most important question to be settled concerns the identification of the issues or dimensions for 
which congruence is assessed, and whether we should take voter preferences or party positions as a 
starting point for measurement. The following section then specifies the issue categories used in the 
analysis, discusses their operationalization, and the methods appropriate to deriving dimensions 
from the issue categories.  
The fifth section presents the results of the analysis, and has three parts. The first discusses 
the make-up of the relevant party system divides in the seven countries. The second part presents 
the results of the analysis of the correspondence between the positions of political parties, measured 
as the mean position of their parliamentary representatives, and the preferences of party electorates. 
The results testify that historical party system trajectories indeed have long-term implications of 
patterns of responsiveness in the 1990s. The final part summarizes the patterns of party competition 
found in the seven countries in terms of representational congruence and the segmentation of 
political competition. 
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The formation of responsive party systems and expectations for Latin America 
 
Party system responsiveness and its impediments 
 
As the actors linking citizens and the political system, parties play a central role in guaranteeing 
democratic governance. In a path-breaking approach, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) have argued 
that democratization entails not only the building of formal democratic institutions, but also of party 
systems that represent the interests of voters in the political process. Only when the basic patterns of 
opposition or conflict are stable do party systems structure the expectations of political actors and 
introduce predictability in politics. This, on the other hand, is considered a central prerequisite of 
democratic accountability and of the congruence between the positions of citizens and their 
representatives (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair, 1997, 2001; Tóka, 1998; Mainwaring and 
Torcal, 2006).  
According to the distinction set out by Herbert Kitschelt (2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 
2007), between programmatic, clientelistic, and charismatic linkages between parties and voters, the 
main impediment to the formation of responsive party systems is the dominance of clientelistic and 
charismatic linkages in many new democracies. Because the parties of notables characteristic of 
pre-democratic elite party systems usually employ clientelistic means to stay in power once the 
suffrage is extended (c.f., Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 175-7; Kreuzer, 2001), I claim that much 
depends on whether these parties are subsequently challenged by strong ideological movements. To 
the degree that the established parties are able to prevent new competitors from entering the system, 
clientelistic practices are likely to remain unaltered. As Shefter (1977, 1993) and Geddes (1994) 
have argued and empirically shown, established parties are able to secure their position by 
distributing particularistic benefits. Hagopian’s (1996) case study of Brazil reveals that clientelism 
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is an instrument of long-established political elites to hold on to their positions of power and 
privilege. Only “externally mobilized parties”, in Shefter’s terminology, which do not have access 
to the ruling circles of power, push for programmatic competition – because programs are all they 
have to offer. By the same token, it can be hypothesized that once ideological party competition has 
been established and parties appeal to voters by offering distinctive policy options, clientelistic 
promises will no longer prove very successful. For voters that are sufficiently informed and are 
offered clear programmatic options, selling their vote for a particularistic benefit is unlikely to be an 
attractive option. Consequently, the initial emergence of a party system that is responsive to the 
preferences of the citizenry emerges as a decisive moment in the evolution of party systems.  
The Western European historical experience testifies that functional conflicts resulting from 
large-scale processes of nation state formation and industrialization were capable of forming party 
systems based on powerful ideologies and firmly rooted in social structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 
1967; Rokkan, 1999; Caramani, 2004; Bartolini, 2005). Latin American trajectories have proven 
much more varied. While some party systems, such as the Brazilian one, have emerged more or less 
from scratch after every disruption of democratic rule, those in Uruguay and Chile still carry the 
imprint of the conflicts prevalent in the early decades of the 20th century, when democracy was first 
established (Dix, 1989; González, 1995; Scully, 1995; Coppedge, 1998; Mainwaring, 1999). Other 
party systems have proved highly stable, but the initial conflicts have faded, and as a result of the 
ensuing loss of differentiation between party profiles, competition has come to center primarily on 
particularistic benefits. Colombia and Venezuela between 1958 and the late 1980s are cases in 
point, as I will argue.  
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Two critical junctures and resulting expectations 
 
These differences can be explained by the interaction of two critical junctures that set responsive 
and non-responsive party systems in Latin America apart.1 The first bifurcation is between party 
systems that institutionalized elite conflict before the expansion of the suffrage in the early 20th 
century, and those that did not. Where rival elites relied on political parties of national scope to 
resolve conflicts, pluralistic elite party systems emerged, which subsequently proved open to 
political newcomers (Coppedge, 1998). In a perspective that puts more emphasis on political 
conflict, Gibson (1996) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) have convincingly argued that nationwide 
conservative parties matter because they provide a means to defend the interests of economic and 
political elites, thus making democracy viable when the suffrage is expanded. I concur with these 
authors in arguing that early pluralism is important because it pushed conservative forces in society 
to form nationwide parties to confront challenges by liberal and radical parties. Where they engaged 
in gentlemen’s agreements with their competitors or relied on the army to secure their interests, on 
the other hand, conservatives were ill-suited to cope with a subsequent, and much more severe 
challenge: the rise of forces seeking to fundamentally transform the political and economic structure 
of society. These are mostly parties of the left, but because they sometimes meshed socialist and 
Fascist ideas, I will refer to them as progressive parties.  
At the second critical juncture, then, is situated during a phase of polarization that hit all 
Latin American countries in the first decades of the 20th century. Either a balance of power between 
old parties and the new claimants for power resulted, and polarization was sustained, or it was 
aborted by more or less violent means. Where party competition remained open and polarized, 
clientelism receded at least partially, and strong partisan attachments based on parties’ contrasting 
ideological offerings developed. Political conflict then socialized successive generations of voters 
                                                
1  This argument is presented in full and substantiated with historical evidence elsewhere (Bornschier, 2012). 
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into the prevailing lines of conflict, perpetuating these alignments in a process similar to that 
experienced by West European party systems (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mair, 2001; Bornschier, 
2010; Ch. 3). 
In Latin America – and ignoring the Central American variations – only Chile and Uruguay 
clearly followed this route. Chile presents the classical case in that new political actors of the 
political left and the Christian Democrats strongly polarized the party system (e.g., Scully, 1992). 
The fact that the Uruguayan party system is a case of high polarization is often overlooked due to 
the strong role of the two traditional parties until quite recently. However, the Colorados’ adoption 
of a progressive profile firmly rooted the party in the working class and polarized the party system 
(Collier and Collier, 2002). The Communist party was never outlawed, and the threat from the left 
forced the Colorados to maintain their left-wing position. While clientelism played a major role in 
certain phases of Uruguayan history, González (1991: 25-8) convincingly argues that politics in 
Uruguay was never only a matter of clientelism, as some may have it. The Frente Amplio, which 
united the Communists, the Christian Democrats, and other progressive forces, then launched the 
most severe assault on clientelism from the 1960s on (Luna, n.d.; González, 1991: 125). 
Contrary to the slender path to a responsive party system, a variety of trajectories results in 
settings in which clientelism remains so pervasive that it is difficult for voters to identify 
contrasting policy platforms. What they have in common is that no sustained polarization of the 
party system occurred in the first half of the 20th century. I call this aborted polarization due to the 
conscious effort either of the established parties, or of successful revolutionary movements to 
restrict competition. There are two basic ways to impede polarization: The first is an outright ban on 
opposition parties. In a more subtle form, established parties use their monopoly on clientelistic 
resources to secure their position and exclude challenging parties. If elites succeed using either of 
these strategies, a dominant party system results, even if more than one party competes in elections 
and the system appears pluralistic at first sight. However, these contexts lack what Levitsky and 
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Way (2010a) term a “level playing field”, making it next to impossible for opposition parties to gain 
power (see also Greene, 2007; Lyne, 2008). Two very different trajectories result in the formation 
of dominant party systems: either the older elite parties restrict competition, or of a revolutionary 
movement succeeds in sweeping the old elite away and establishes dominance. In the remainder of 
this section, I sketch out how polarization ended in the remaining five cases that are covered by the 
data used later on in this paper.  
In Colombia, elites restricted competition after the civil war, despite the fact that 
conservative interests held a strong position in both traditional parties, one of the features the 
country’s party system shared with that in Uruguay. There is abundant evidence that clientelistic 
linkages predominate in Colombia at least since the late 1950s.2 In Mexico and Venezuela, on the 
other hand, progressive parties won over their conservative rivals so easily that a dominant party 
system resulted. Despite some degree of open contestation, the Mexican Party of the 
Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) was able to maintained dominance for decades thanks to the 
distribution of patronage and political favors.3 In Venezuela, a party cartel agreed to share power in 
1958, and the party system soon lost any clear ideological differentiation.4  
Finally, the frequent intervention of the military impeded prolonged ideological polarization 
in Peru and Argentina. As a result, Peru’s Popular Revolutionary American Alliance (APRA) 
moved to the center in an illusive quest to gain acceptance by the military, watering down the 
party’s programmatic profile (Collier and Collier, 2002: 476-483). Furthermore, rather than ousting 
clientelistic linkages, APRA seems to have engaged in extensive patronage and clientelistic change 
itself (ibid.; Hilliker, 1971: 74-113). The main difference between Peru and Argentina is that in the 
latter case, Peronism’s dominance in the union movement kept the antagonism between Peronists 
and non-Peronists – primarily represented by the Radicals in the party arena – alive even during 
                                                
2  See Wilde (1978), Archer (1990; 1995), Martz (1997: 35), Collier and Collier (2002: 671-3), Di Tella (2004: 94-6), 
Pizarro Leongómez (2006). 
3  McDonald and Ruhl (1989: 48-9, 51-2), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 199-4), Langston and Morgenstern (2009), 
Levitsky and Way (2010b: 149-161). 
4  Karl (1986: 213), Coppedge (1994: 18-46, 136-52), Roberts (2003), Lyne (2008). 
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non-democratic periods (Collier and Collier, 2002: 359-9; 484-97; 721-42). As a result, strong 
political identities formed despite a rather limited experience with open democratic competition. 
Thus, a party system rooted in social structure re-emerged in the 1980s.5 Consequently, I expect 
intermediate levels of party system responsiveness in Argentina, while Peru is likely to display low 
levels of programmatic structuring and congruence between parties and voters.  
 
 
The measurement of party system responsiveness: Theory and analytical approach 
 
The responsiveness of governments to the preferences of citizens is a defining attribute of 
polyarchy, according to Robert Dahl (1971; 1989), or of the liberal concept of representation, 
according to Hannah Pitkin (1967). One of the central junctures in the “chain of responsiveness” 
(Powell 2004) that runs from public preferences to political policies, is the congruence between 
voter preferences and party positions. According to the “responsible party model”, first theorized by 
the APSA Committee on Political Parties (1950), and synthesized by Thomassen (1994: 251-2), 
congruence is achieved if, first, parties offer diverging programmatic offerings, and second, voters 
chose parties according to these offerings. Consequently, the quality of representation has 
frequently been assessed by looking at the correspondence between the political preferences of 
voters and their representatives (e.g., Dalton, 1985; Powell, 2000; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, 
2010; see also Diamond and Morlino, 2005).  
There is less consensus on how to define the substantial issues relevant for measuring the 
congruence of representation. In the advanced democracies, both the left-right dimension (e.g., 
Klingemann, 1995; Powell, 2000), as well as more specific issue categories have been used (e.g., 
                                                
5  See Di Tella (2004: 164-70), Madsen and Snow (1991: 134-50), McGuire (1995: 233-6). 
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Dalton, 1985). In one of the rare analyses of this kind conducted in Latin America, Luna and 
Zechmeister (2005, 2010) measure responsiveness across five issue bundles, each of which is 
tapped using at least two separate issues. The potential problem with their approach is that we do 
not know whether all of these issue bundles (and the items used to measure them) are in fact 
politically relevant. If not, we should not expect congruence, as the issue will play no role in 
determining party choice. Congruent representation then results of chance, rather than due to the 
causal chain postulated by the responsible party model: If the issue happens to aligns with a 
relevant dimension of conflict, congruence will be high; if not, it will be low, but this must not 
indicate representational failure, since the issue may not be salient for voters. Thus, unless we have 
strong theoretical reasons to expect specific issues to be politically relevant across all countries, 
starting with a pre-defined set of issues involves at least two problems. First, it risks 
underestimating the degree of congruent representation due to the inclusion of issues that are not 
salient, and where congruence is likely to be low. Second, such an approach biases the results in 
favor of those countries where issues are strongly integrated into over-arching dimensions. 
For this reason, I start out by empirically assessing the relevant dimensions of political 
conflict for each country. This immediately poses the question whether these dimensions should be 
determined among voters or at the level of the party system. According to the classical, 
unidirectional notion of representation, voters chose “promissory” representatives who promise to 
implement certain policies (Mansbridge, 2003; Disch, 2011). Consequently, the issues most 
relevant to voters should constitute the starting point of an analysis of the quality of representation. 
Apart from the empirical difficulty of assessing what these issues might be,6 however, such an 
approach would neglect the independent role of the party system in shaping the link between the 
social and the political (Sartori, 1968). From a cleavage perspective, parties bundle issues into 
broader dimensions that help voters make sense of what political conflict is about (Schattschneider, 
1975). Citizens will only be able to chose representatives that endorse their substantive policy 
                                                
6  A viable strategy is that pursued by Moreno (1999). 
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preferences if parties “stand for something”, in Klingemann et al.’s (1994) words. What is more, 
cleavage theory assumes that new generations of voters are socialized into the prevailing structure 
of conflict, thus assigning an important role to elite political actors in shaping politics (Bartolini and 
Mair, 1990; Bornschier, 2010: Ch. 3). This mechanism also underlies the critical juncture approach 
outlined in the preceding section, as it explains why ideology continues to play an central role in 
those party systems that are set on a programmatic track early on.  
There are also normative perspectives on representation that would suggest a focus on elite 
conflict. Disch (2011) has recently suggested that political theory needs to come to terms with the 
abundant empirical evidence suggesting that political parties play an important role in shaping 
citizen preferences. In what she aptly calls a “mobilization conception of political representation”, 
the representative process is theorized as dynamic and interactive, without necessarily implying that 
parties manipulate the preferences of their supporters. But rather than dismissing the utility of the 
concept of congruence in assessing the quality of representation, I would suggest that a high degree 
of congruence precisely indicates that the process of reciprocal influence – or “reflexivity”, in 
Disch’s terms – between parties and voters is actually at work, even if we cannot measure it 
directly. 
The point of departure for measuring congruence in this paper is thus constituted by the 
dimensions that set parties apart. For this reason, I reconstruct the dimensions found among elites at 
the voter level for the measurement of how well parties are in tune with their voters.  
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Operationalization and methods 
 
The analysis uses data from the first wave of the University of Salamanca Surveys of Latin 
American Legislators (PELA), for which face-to-face interviews with legislators were conducted 
between 1995 and 1996. This point in time is very close to the fieldwork of the World Values 
Survey’s (WVS) 1994-99 wave, where most interviews were also conducted in 1995 and 1996. 
Combining these data sources, it is possible to assess the congruence of representation in Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Colombia does not form part of the first wave of the 
PELA surveys, but the 1998 survey happens to coincide exactly with the year in which the 
fieldwork for the WVS was conducted in that country. The analysis thus covers seven countries in 
total.  
I start out by grouping the issue-specific items contained in the elite and mass surveys into 
the following broader, theoretically defined issue-categories:7  
 
Economic issues 
- Welfare: Expansion of or defense of a generous welfare state, support for public education, 
redistribution, and equality. 
- Economic liberalism: Opposition to market regulation, and protectionism, support for 
deregulation, for more competition, and privatization. 
 
Non-economic issues 
- Regime: Assessment of past military regime (if there was a military dictatorship). Additional 
issues used on the demand side: support for democracy, opposition against authoritarianism. 
- Army (only measured at the supply side): Support for a strong national defense, against reducing 
the military’s budget (to some extent, this can be interpreted as a regime dimension). 
- Cultural liberalism: Opposition to traditional moral values, support for gender equality, the 
right to abortion and divorce. 
- Environmental protection: Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic energy. 
                                                
7  The categories are derived from an analysis of political space in Western Europe (Kriesi et al., 2008), and adapted 
to the Latin American context. 
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I use principal component factor analysis to test whether the items indeed measure the same 
underlying concept. A list of the items used and a schematic summary of the results of the factor 
analyses are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. There are several reasons for using more 
general issue categories, rather than specific items in the analysis: Most importantly, politically 
relevant issue-categories are typically broader than the items used in elite and mass surveys. 
Consequently, we will want to include more than one item for each concept in order to reduce 
measurement error and to tap the underlying issue categories, rather than more specific aims.8 
Moreover, if we were to assess congruence using specific items, the question wording would have 
to be identical, which is not typically the case in different datasets. If we include as many items as 
possible to measure broader underlying categories, on the other hand, we can compare political 
supply and political demand even if the items do not match exactly. The categories are 
operationalized separately for each country, since we cannot be sure that the specific items can be 
grouped into broader categories in the same way across countries. Moreover, some categories may 
in fact be too broad: In the case of the regime issue, factor analyses of the specific items often yield 
more than one dimension. Most of the time, these multiple dimensions make sense in theoretical 
terms. Where this is the case, I thus include all sub-components in the ensuing analysis of the 
dimensionality of political conflict.9 For example, privatization often proved to be empirically 
distinct from economic liberalism.  
To determine the relevant dimensions of conflict based on the issue categories described 
above, I rely on discriminant analysis. This technique reveals which issues structure legislators’ 
party membership, and we can interpret which broader political divisions these issues represent.10 
                                                
8  Rosas (2010: 87-94) performs a discriminant analysis of the ideological dimensions structuring legislatures similar 
to mine, using the same data. Because he uses the individual items contained in the PELA surveys, rather than 
operationalizing broader issue categories, there are some differences in our results.  
9  Since the dimensions resulting from the factor analysis are not correlated, it is evident that one sub-dimension may 
be politically relevant, while the other is not. 
10  This implies assessing the responsiveness of parties, not of individual legislators. Theoretically, we may therefore 
underestimate chains of accountability that run from voters to individual representatives in weakly structured party 
systems. Measuring individual representation would require a very different analytical approach, however, and is 
impossible unless we have information on the position of individual representatives that survey respondents voted 
for.  
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Discriminant analysis is preferable over factor analysis because the latter only tells us which 
dimensions underlie legislators’ orientations, not whether they set representatives from different 
parties apart. In fact, factor analysis tends to produce more dimensions in countries where a 
discriminant analysis reveals party membership to be only weakly structured by ideology (e.g., 
Peru), and the factors are not always easy to interpret. On the other hand, factor analysis produces a 
unidimensional solution for Chile, while discriminant analysis revealed traces of the religious 
cleavage that help to make sense of the divisions within the left and right ideological blocks. 
On the voter side, most of the issue categories can be operationalized using items contained 
in the WVS (again using principal component factor analysis, see Table A2). The exception are 
attitudes regarding the army, where we lack information in the WVS. On the other hand, voters give 
reasonably varied responses to questions regarding the desirability of democracy and the support for 
authoritarian rule, while the corresponding items (with the significant exception of Chile) yield 
uniformly pro-democratic responses in the PELA surveys. Having constructed the issue categories 
at the voter level, I measure respondents’ positions along the dimensions found in the elite analysis, 
combining the relevant issue categories using factor analysis.11 
Because the positions of parties and voters are not measured on the same scales, they cannot 
be directly compared. Representatives’ and voters’ answers may vary according to the wording of 
the question in the survey, thus there is no way to make the two scales strictly comparable. 
Consequently, the correspondence of party positions and electoral preferences can be judged only in 
relative terms. I thus measure congruence regressing the position of the party the respondent voted 
for on his/her individual preference along a given dimension. Since the variance of the dependent 
variable is limited by the typically low number of parties competing, I use ordered logit regression. 
                                                
11  As a rule of thumb, I consider issue categories loading |0.4| or higher on the canonical variables derived from the 
discriminant analysis of party positions as constitutive of a dimension. Consequently, I use only these categories to 
reconstruct elite divides at the voter level. In all cases, I took care to ensure that the issue categories contributed to a 
similar degree to the factors at the voter level as they did to the canonical variables at the party level, which in some 
cases implied omitting categories with loadings between |0.4| and |0.5|. A more detailed documentation of the 
operationalization is available from the author upon request. 
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The most important information provided by this analysis is not the coefficient (which again is not 
independent of the differing scales on which parties and voters are placed), but whether individual 
preferences are a significant predictor of party choice. Consequently, I use the z-statistic of the 
ordered logit regression as a measure for the congruence of representation that can be compared 
across countries. 
In the next section, I first provide a summary of the dimensions structuring party positions in 
the seven countries studied, and then present graphs showing the positions of parties and voters on 
those dimensions. Finally, I summarize the results by characterizing the dominant dimensions 
uncovered by the analysis in terms of the congruence of representation they engender and the type 
of party competition they engender. 
 
 
Patterns of responsiveness after re-democratization in Latin America 
 
The nature of ideological divisions 
 
In terms of the conflicts structuring party systems across our sample, two groups of countries stand 
out in the results of the discriminant analysis presented in Table 1. In the first group, composed of 
Chile and Uruguay, the regime divide emerges as the dimension most clearly setting legislators 
apart based on their party affiliation. Yet, economic issues are meshed into these regime divides, 
which mirrors the agenda of economic liberalization pursued by the military in both countries 
(although the liberalizing thrust was clearly stronger in Chile under Pinochet than during Uruguay’s 
military regime; see Kitschelt el al., 2010: Ch. 7). Interestingly, these are the two countries whose 
historical trajectory discussed at the outset of this paper leads me to expect party systems to be most 
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See footnote 3 
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responsive to voter preferences. In Uruguay, the first dimension is most strongly determined 
by the army issue. I interpret this as a regime divide because positions regarding the army are 
significantly correlated with assessments of the military regime of the 1970s, yet display 
much more variance. Basically, legislators almost unanimously view the military dictatorship 
as negative, yet differ starkly in their view of the military today. By contrast, in Chile 
legislators differ significantly in their assessment of the Pinochet dictatorship, and the regime 
divide is thus measured using this issue. Although economic liberalism also plays a role in 
defining the first dimension, the regime issue sets parties apart much more powerfully. Chile 
also features a second divide between cultural conservatism and cultural liberalism, 
reminiscent of the country’s religious cleavage. 
In the second group of countries, economic divides are decisive. In Argentina, parties 
differ mostly in terms of a state-market antagonism that juxtaposes a welfare statist position 
and economic liberalism. The fact that the most important divide is structured by economic 
issues mirrors the strong historical polarization between Peronist and anti-Peronist camps. As 
we shall see, however, parties occupy unexpected positions along this divide. In Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Mexico, the analysis reveals traces of the religious cleavage that separated 
conservatives and liberals at the turn from the 19th to the 20th centuries, but the associated 
questions are meshed with economic issues into more encompassing socio-economic divides. 
Two cases stand out: First, Mexico features a two-dimensional structure of political space. 
Apart from the socio-economic antagonism, a regime divide emerges as a separate dimension 
of political space. Secondly, Peru is the only country where the analysis fails to reveal a 
statistically significant ideological division. 
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Assessing the congruence of representation 
 
Figures 1-9 present graphs showing the positions of parties and of their voters along the 
divides identified in the preceding section. The upper dimension in each figure represents the 
positions of parties and the lower dimension the position of electorates. Both the positions of 
legislators and those of voters have been standardized, and the center of the axes thus 
indicates the mean of the distribution. The left and right markers on the axes indicate the 
values of -1 and 1, respectively. Apart from the aggregated mean position of parties and 
electorates, figures also represent the homogeneity or heterogeneity of positions, calculated as 
the standard deviation of positions within a party or a party electorate. Beyond reflecting how 
strongly parties and electorates are united by ideology, this gives an indication of the 
ideological overlap between the representatives of different parties, and that between their 
electorates. Finally, the z-value of the ordered logit regression I use to assess congruence is 
indicated below each figure, together with the number of party-electorate pairs on which the 
regression is based. While the PELA survey only identifies the representatives of larger 
parties, the WVS includes voters of parties not included in the PELA surveys. In the interest 
of legibility, however, minor parties are not shown in the figures. 
 
Cases with favorable historical preconditions 
Figure 1 presents the results for Uruguay. The party system is strongly polarized along the 
regime-cum-welfare divide, and parties clearly fall into two camps: The two traditional 
parties – the Colorados (PC) and the Blancos/Partido Nacional (PN) – form a pro-military 
camp, while Frente Amplio (FA) representatives stand out for their pro-democratic/pacifist 
convictions. At the same time, FA representatives are in favor of a strong welfare state, while 
the two traditional parties are more skeptical of welfare state. This division is closely mirrored 
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at the voter side, which is remarkable given that positions of parties are determined using their 
positions regarding the army, while those of voters are measured in terms of items relating to 
the regime dimension. What is more, voters’ regime preferences are highly significant 
predictors of their party choice, as indicated by the z-value of the ordered logit regression.  
The second dimension revealed by the discriminant analysis in Uruguay sets apart the 
representatives of the two traditional rightist parties, but it is not easy to interpret. The PN 
tends to be more culturally conservative, but less supportive of the army, than the PC. Thus, I 
confine the analysis to the first dimension, which accounts for 92% of the variance explained 
by the model. While the historical antagonism resulted from the polarization between PC and 
PN, the growth of the Frente Amplio has resulted in a new division, which separates a left-
wing and a right-wing camp which eventually reached a similar electoral size. In comparative 
terms, the Urugayan party system is very polarized, as we will see, and parties are highly 
representative of voter preferences along the regime divide that has surfaced in the aftermath 
of the military dictatorship of the 1970s. 
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 3 parties): 8.95 (p!0.000) 
Figure 1: Uruguay – Parties and Voters on the Regime Divide 
Legend: FA, Frente Amplio; PN, Partido National; PC, Partido Colorado. 
 
More strongly than in Uruguay, the regime divide has an economic component in 
Chile, and party position are even more polarized (Figure 2). As in Uruguay, two clearly 
separated camps are revealed by the analysis. The Partido Por la Democracia (PPD), the 
FA PCPN
FA PCPN
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Socialists (PS), and the Christian Democrats (DC), which together formed the Concertación 
governments, take a pro-democratic left-wing position, while Renovatión Nacional (RN) and 
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) hold favorable views of the Pinochet dictatorship and 
endorse market liberalism. This divide is clearly mirrored in the Chilean electorate, as there is 
hardly any overlap between the electorates of the left and right (remember that we must be 
cautious to interpret the positions of electorates as more centrist than those of parties due to 
differences in question wording).12 The figure for congruence shows a highly significant 
effect of regime preferences on party choice.  
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 5 parties): 4.29 (p!0.000) 
Figure 2: Chile – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Economic Liberalism Divide 
Legend: PPD, Partido Por la Democracia; PS, Socialist Party; DC, Christian Democrat Party; RN, Renovatión 
Nacional; UDI, Unión Demócrata Independiente. 
 
The second dimension in Chile is enlightening because it helps to explain alignments 
within the pro-democratic and authoritarian blocks. Thus, with regard to moral issues related 
to the traditional religious cleavage, one party in each block switches sides: Renovatión 
National is authoritarian, but secular, and thus situates itself in the culturally liberal camp 
together with the two left-wing parties. The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, are pro-
democratic, but culturally conservative, and form the culturally traditionalist camp together 
                                                
12  Contrary to the other cases, a discriminant analysis of voter issue positions reveals a first dimension exactly 
identical to that found to structure party oppositions in Chile. For this reason, I directly use the first 
discriminant function to position voters in Chile. The second dimension is operationalized using only 
cultural liberalism. 
RN UDIDCPPDPS
RN UDIDCPPD PS
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with UDI. At the party system level, this dimension is less polarized than the regime divide, 
however. On the voter side, this dimension is far less polarized: While the relative positions 
of parties and voters more or less match, electorates display high degrees of overlap in their 
preferences. Although both divides thus play a statistically significant role in structuring 
partisan alignments in Chile, we can conclude that the second division is less important than 
the first. This is also reflected in the somewhat lower measure for congruence along the 
second dimension. 
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 5 parties): 2.12 (p!0.034) 
Figure 3: Chile – Parties and Voters on the Cultural Liberalism Divide 
Legend: see Figure 2. 
 
With respect to Uruguay and Chile, the high levels of responsiveness displayed by 
party systems in the mid-1990s conforms to the expectations derived from the historical 
analysis. These are the two cases where historically formed partisan attachments created 
favorable preconditions for the re-emergence of responsive party systems after re-
democratization. For Argentina, on the other hand, I expected intermediate levels of 
responsiveness due to strong polarization between the 1940s and the 1960s, but a much more 
limited experience of open democratic competition. Figure 4 shows the economic dimension, 
and portrays the situation after the 1995 elections. These took place during Carlos Menem’s 
presidency, who performed a policy switch from the traditional state interventionist penchant 
of the Peronist movement to an appraisal of economic liberalism (Stokes, 2001). Figure 4 
RN UDIDC
PPD
PS
RN UDI DCPPDPS
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shows that the Peronists (Partido Justicialista, PJ) and the Radicals (UCR) switched sides on 
the economic dimension as a consequence: The UCR now takes a more state interventionist 
stance than its historical rival. Predictably, the most left-wing position is taken by FREPASO, 
a spin-off disagreeing with the Peronists’ endorsement of free markets. Although party 
electorates are not strongly differentiated along the economic dimension, they do line up in 
the same order as the parties themselves, and individual voter preferences are highly 
significant predictors of party choice. This seems to indicate that Peronist voters to some 
degree followed the party into more economically liberal terrain. On the other hand, the 
difference between PJ and UCR is minimal, leaving ample room for non-ideological linkages, 
which are considered to play an important role according to the country-specific literature. In 
particular, some authors have suggested that the Peronists increasingly relied on clientelism to 
make their lower-class support base swallow their liberal economic policies (Brusco et al. 
2004, Stokes 2005, Levitsky 2003). The results also point to some disenchantment among 
left-leaning voters, as non-voters take a relatively distinct left-wing position close to 
FREPASO supporters (in most of the other figures, non voters are not shown due to their 
centrist positions). 
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 3 parties): 3.7 (p!0.000) 
Figure 4: Argentina – Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide 
Legend: FREPASO, Frente para un País Solidario; UCR, Unión Cívica Radical; PJ, Partido Justicialista 
(Peronists); no vote, respondents who declare they would not vote or would vote blank if elections were held the 
next day. 
 
PJUCRFREPASO
no vote/blank
PJUCRFREPASO
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Countries lacking favorable historical preconditions 
Among the remaining countries, Peru shares with Argentina the historical feature of a strong 
progressive party. The Peruvian trajectory deviates from the Argentine path, however, in that 
the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) moved to the center or even further 
to the right from the 1950s on (Collier and Collier, 2002: 477). Unfortunately, we do not have 
data to assess congruence directly after the return to civilian rule in 1980. APRA won the 
1985 presidential elections, but the government’s poor economic performance, the 
disintegration of the United Left, situated to the left of APRA, and the defeat of the right-wing 
alliance by Alberto Fujimori opened a new (semi-)authoritarian episode in Peruvian history 
(Di Tella, 2004: 154-157, McDonald and Ruhl, 1989: 214-216). The data used in this paper 
portrays the situation midway into Fujimori’s period in office.  
Although the discriminant function does not reach statistical significance, party 
positions differ considerably on the divide shown in Figure 5. This dimension meshes regime 
issues and positions along the state-market divide. APRA occupies an economically left-wing 
position and calls for limits on the power of the army. While Unión por el Perú (UPP)13 is 
situated close to APRA, “Cambio ’90-New Majority”, the vehicle whereby Alberto Fujimori 
gained the presidency, occupies a right-wing position. The other parties cannot be positioned 
due to their limited representation in the legislature. At the voter level, economic liberalism, 
welfare state support, and regime preferences prove unrelated, and it thus makes little sense to 
aggregate them into a single dimension. Instead, Figure 5 shows the positions of electorates 
with respect to the regime issue alone. Preferences along the democracy-autocracy continuum 
form a powerful predictor of party choice: APRA’s electorate is pro-democratic and skeptical 
of a strong leader, while Fujimori’s supporters have authoritarian credentials. Congruence is 
non-existent, on the other hand, with respect to both economic liberalism and welfare (see the 
z-values of the ordered logit regression below Figure 5). Rather than mirroring substantive 
                                                
13  UPP was founded in 1994 and later fused with the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP). 
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ideological differences, then, the major antagonism in the mid-1990s is between those who 
support and those who oppose an authoritarian incumbent.  
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 3 parties), calculated separately by issue: 
 regime: 3.3 (p!0.001) 
economic liberalism: 0.65 (p=0.51) 
welfare: -0.23 (p=0.82) 
Figure 5: Peru – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Economic Divide 
Legend: APRA, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana; UPP, Unión por el Perú, CAMBIO ’90-NM, 
Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría; none/dk, no party preference, don’t know. 
 
The remaining cases share with Peru a lack of prolonged periods of ideological 
polarization that would have anchored party systems in the populace. Even more 
unambiguously than in Peru, the experiences of Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico represent 
instances of aborted polarization. In Colombia, the traditional parties restricted competition, 
while victorious revolutionary movements established dominance in the two other countries. 
In Mexico, this resulted in single party dominance that was only overcome in 2000. In 
Venezuela, a two-party system eventually resulted from the 1958 pact, but as I have argued, 
there is abundant evidence that this compromise entailed a loss of parties’ distinct 
programmatic profiles.  
Figure 6 presents the positions of parties and voters on the socio-economic divide in 
Colombia. At the time of the elite survey, the two traditional parties still held roughly three 
quarters of the seats in parliament. While their positions appear distinct, the Liberal Party 
APRAUPP CAMBIO’90-NM
APRAUPP
CAMBIO’90-NM
none/dk
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(PL) being more economically left-wing, more culturally liberal, as well as more skeptical of 
the army, this difference is not strongly mirrored in the location of their electorates, and the 
traditional parties’ electorates overlap to a large degree. The results thus confirm the 
hypothesis that these two parties are not connected to their voters by means of programmatic 
linkages. As a result of their limited number of parliamentary representatives, we lack 
information on left-wing parties in the PELA survey. The only other electorate that can be 
located is that of Movimento Cívico Independiente (INDEP), which roughly 15% of survey 
respondents claim to support. Another 31% of respondents report to support no party at all, 
and these respondents are located to the right of the two traditional parties. We can thus 
conclude that the continuing lack of viable parties on the left precludes the Colombian party 
system from achieving responsiveness. 
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 2 parties): 1.26 (p=0.21) 
Figure 6: Colombia – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide 
Legend: PL, Partido Liberal Colombiano; PC, Partido Conservador Colombiano; INDEP, Movimento Cívico 
Independiente. 
 
While Venezuela’s party system had been characterized by extraordinary stability 
between 1958 and the 1980s, it virtually collapsed in the following decade. Three years prior 
to Hugo Chávez’ victory of the presidency, the party system is clearly unresponsive along the 
socio-economic divide shown in Figure 7. Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI, the two 
main antagonists prior to 1958, hardly occupy distinct positions. Convergencia National 
PL PC
PL PC INDEPnone
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(CONV), a spin-off from the long-established COPEI, is situated close to the traditional 
parties. The space to the left divide is occupied by Causa R and Movimiento al Socialismo 
(MAS). On the voter side, preferences over the welfare state and cultural liberalism are not 
correlated, and Figure 7 therefore only shows positions with respect to welfare. While the 
differences between electorates are very small, especially given their extensive ideological 
overlap, it is striking to note that COPEI’s electorate is the most left wing, while MAS voters 
are actually the most right-wing. Overall, voters’ socio-economic preferences are unrelated to 
their party choice.  
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 5 parties): -1.48 (p=.14) 
Figure 7: Venezuela – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide 
Legend: CAUSA R, La Causa Radical; MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; CONV, Convergencia National; AD, 
Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente. 
 
From this perspective, the subsequent implosion of the party system is not so 
surprising. If my historical argument is correct, the party system progressively lost its roots in 
society due to the failure of the two major parties to offer differing policy packages to voters. 
Although new left-wing parties gained support in the 1980s, they seem to have been unable to 
present a viable alternative to AD and COPEI. A striking 59% of the respondents in the WVS 
declare that they would vote for none of the existing parties, or answer “don’t know” when 
asked about their party preference. Thus, the institutionalized left was unable to re-establish 
confidence in party politics. 
ADCOPEI MAS
CAUSA RCONV
AD COPEIMASCAUSA R CONV
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In Mexico, we encounter a situation a few years before the victory of the long-
established Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) finally ended the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional’s (PRI) dominance in the 2000 elections. Figure 8 shows the socio-economic 
divide in 1995. PRI occupies a center-left position and is challenged by the Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD) to its left and by the PAN far to its right. On the voter side, 
the PRI’s electorate is actually the most left-wing, but the most striking finding is how small 
the differences between electorates are. Despite the stark differences in party ideology, the 
parties’ electorates overlap to a large degree in their preferences. This is partially a result of 
the aggregation of cultural liberalism, welfare, and economic liberalism into a single 
dimension, as differences between electorates are statistically with respect to the single 
components of the socio-economic dimension (results of ANOVA analysis not shown). In 
other words, the way parties aggregate issues into the prime dimension of party competition 
in Mexico is not a reflection of their voters’ preferences. But using respondents’ preferences 
with respect to single issues to predict party preference does not improve the result in terms of 
congruence, shown below Figure 8. Thus, although Mexican parties present very clearly 
distinct ideological alternatives with respect to economic issues, voters are not aligned with 
parties based on these programmatic offerings. 
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 3 parties): 0.79 (p=0.43) 
Figure 8: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide 
Legend: PRD, Partido de la Revolución Democrática; PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional; PAN, Partido 
Acción Nacional. 
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In part, the low level of differentiation between electorates along the socio-economic 
dimension may be due to the fact that this dimension is cross-cut by a regime divide. While 
opposition parties in Mexico have difficulties in joining forces to defeat the PRI due to their 
non-centrist economic policy positions, they are united against their long-term rival along the 
army dimension (Greene 2007). Figure 9 confirms this finding. On the voter side, positions 
are measured using those regime items that do not directly address the democratic ideal, but 
rather ask about preferences regarding a strong leader and the role of the army. Again, 
however, there is a large overlap in the positions of electorates. The regime divide, in other 
words, had not yet fully crystallized in the mid-1990s. 
 
 
Congruence (z-value, 3 parties): 1.5 (p=.13) 
Figure 9: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Army Divide 
Legend: see Figure 8. 
 
Policy congruence and types of party competition  
 
We are now in a position to summarize the results of the analysis of representational 
congruence. Apart from the degree to which party positions and electoral preferences match, 
which has been the prime focus of this paper, the results of my analysis also allow for a 
characterization of the type of party competition prevalent in countries with high and low 
levels of congruence. I classify the divisions found in the seven countries covered in this 
paper along two dimensions: congruence and polarization. Polarization is an attribute of party 
PANPRD PRI
PAN
PRD PRI
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systems that helps characterize the nature of competition between parties (see Dalton, 2008). 
The more polarized party positions are, the less voters will radically change party preference 
from one election to the next. Perhaps they will vote for a different party with similar policy 
positions, but given the stark ideological contrasts, it is unlikely that they will support a party 
from a different ideological block. Polarization, in other words, is an indicator of the 
competitiveness or segmentation of political divisions. Segmented divides are characteristic of 
long term divisions rooted in social structure, which we commonly refer to as cleavages 
(Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mair 1997: 162-171). The less polarized the party system, on the 
other hand, the more parties compete for the same groups of voters. Parties then behave in 
ways that approximate Schumpeter’s (1993 [1942]) and Downs’ (1957) characterization of 
democracy: Competing teams of politicians make appeals to the median voter. Segmentation 
and competition are thus inversely related; the more a party system is segmented, the less real 
competition there is. If a dimension is competitive, however, then party loyalties are likely to 
be substantially weaker. The crucial point, however, is that party systems may be responsive 
to voter preferences both under conditions of competition and segmentation, and we thus 
cannot say a priori that one type of competition is normatively superior to the other. 
In terms of practical measurement, I use the polarization of party electorates to 
capture segmentation, since the latter implies not only that parties present distinctive 
programmatic platforms, but also that this distinction is rooted in contrasting voter positions. 
As we have seen, some party systems offer clear ideological alternatives, while electorates are 
rather centrist – a situation that does not meet the characteristics associated with 
segmentation.14 To measure the polarization of electorates, I use the standard deviation of 
their positions along a given dimension, weighting the standard deviation by party size.15 For 
congruence, I employ the measure used throughout this paper, namely, the z-value of the 
                                                
14  Kitschelt et al. (1999) refer to this type of representation as “polarized trusteeship”. 
15  Party strength is derived from the PELA elite surveys. 
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ordered logit regression of parties’ programmatic positions on voters’ ideological preferences. 
Figure 10 presents the two-dimensional space created by congruence and polarization (in 
those cases where political space proved two-dimensional, each dimension is located 
separately). Values of congruence below 2 do not reach statistical significance, thus this is a 
useful cut-off point to distinguish between responsive and unresponsive party systems. In 
terms of polarization, it is difficult to define in absolute terms when polarization is high and 
when it is low, and I have rather arbitrarily drawn a line that runs halfway between the 
theoretical minimum (zero differentiation between party electorates) and the most polarized 
case, namely, the regime-economic dimension in Chile. It is best, however, to think of the 
vertical dimension as representing a continuum. 
Figure 10 shows that the regime-cum-economy divides in Uruguay and Chile, the two 
cases with favorable historical preconditions for party system responsiveness, stand out both 
in the degree to which parties mirror voter preferences, as well as in terms of polarization. 
These divides thereby exhibit some of the core characteristics of long-term divisions we 
commonly call cleavages. Chile’s cultural dimension, on the other hand, is substantially less 
segmented, and also structures party preferences less powerfully (though still significantly). 
The traditional religious cleavage thus clearly seems inferior in salience to the new divide that 
centers on the regime question and on economic liberalism. The economic divide in 
Argentina, on the other hand, is best characterized as a competitive political dimension, 
mirroring the fact that the Peronists leapfrogged their traditional rival’s position by adopting 
economic liberalism. Peru’s regime divide is also situated in the lower right quadrant, but one 
must keep in mind that rather than mirroring substantive policy differences, this is simply an 
expression of the polarization around Fujimori’s authoritarian regency. 
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Figure 10: Congruence and Polarization in the Seven Cases and Resulting Types of Divide 
 
A number of party systems fail to be representative of voter preferences, namely, the 
cases of Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. I have tentatively defined situations of high 
polarization and low congruence as instances of party system cartelization, while low 
polarization and low congruence is simply indicative of unresponsiveness. The three cases of 
incongruent representation all lie closer to the latter pole, but they differ considerably in their 
history. Party systems were in the process of disintegration in the 1990s in Venezuela and 
Colombia, and it is plausible to presume that the failure of the major parties to offer clear 
alternatives and to adequately represent the preferences of their voters is a major driver of this 
evolution. Mexico, on the other hand, is a new democracy, where party alignments based on 
the regime issue and the economic division expressed by political parties may be in the 
process of being formed (see Domínguez, 2009). Five years prior to the pivotal 2000 election, 
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in which the opposition for the first time in history triumphed over the once-dominant PRI, 
however, this was clearly not yet the case.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented evidence for vast differences in the congruence of representation 
across seven Latin American countries. Based on an analysis of the dimensions setting parties 
apart, I have measured to which degree the positions of parties are mirrored by those of their 
electorates. The differences revealed can be explained rather well by historical patterns of 
party system formation. In countries that experienced longer periods of ideological 
polarization, and thus developed responsive party systems in the first half of the 20th century, 
parties proved similarly responsive of voter preferences in the mid-1990s. Whether or not 
countries democracy survived in the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, has left no traces on 
party systems. Strong loyalties between social groups and political parties have the capacity to 
survive authoritarian periods, and party systems re-surfaced in remarkably similar shape in 
Uruguay and Chile in the 1980s. While the dominant economic division has remained salient, 
the regime issue – setting apart pro-democratic and authoritarian forces – now also structures 
party oppositions. It is striking that these two cases, which most clearly exhibit the historical 
preconditions conductive to party systems that closely mirror voter preferences, not only 
exhibit the highest levels of responsiveness, but also remain much more segmented that those 
in the other countries studied. Responsiveness is thus not primarily a product of competition, 
but results from long-term bonds between voters and political parties. 
Parties in Argentina also show rather high levels of congruence, despite the fact that 
the Peronists performed a shift from statist to pro-market policies in the 1990s. As a result, 
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however, the economic divide expressed by the Peronists and the Radicals is no longer 
segmented, but has become a competitive dimension. Apparently, parties strongly anchored in 
the populace are able to convince voters of non-orthodox positions and shift their preferences 
to some degree, in line with a growing literature emphasizing the role of agency in cleavage 
politics (Enyedi, 2005; for an overview, see Bornschier, 2009). In a less optimistic reading, 
the growing use of clientelistic inducements to mobilize voters, which the country-specific 
literature has documented (Gibson, 1997; Levitsky, 2003; Brusco et al., 2004; Stokes 2005), 
might be a side-effect of the Peronists’ quest for votes across the entire political spectrum.  
Low levels of congruence, on the other hand, are an indication that distinctive policy 
propositions are not parties’ main currency in mobilizing voters. Ideology’s main rival, of 
course, is clientelism. Although it is difficult to measure clientelism directly, analyzing the 
congruence of representation allows an indirect assessment of whether parties use clientelistic 
resources to attract voters. To some degree, programmatic and clientelistic linkages are 
compatible, and we cannot read off the occurrence of clientelist exchanges from the 
congruence of representation directly. But we can assess whether clientelism takes on its most 
appalling form from a normative perspective, where it precludes voters from exerting 
influence on government policies. Weak dimensions underlying party positions point to a lack 
of programmatic structuring. Likewise, centrist average positions of party electorates 
accompanied by strong internal heterogeneity indicate that they are held together by 
particularistic exchanges, rather than policy preferences, impeding voters from influencing 
national policy.  
Policy is clearly not what party-voter linkages were primarily about in Peru, 
Colombia, Venezuela, and not in Mexico except perhaps more recently. Although Colombia 
had formally been a democracy for several decades, the exclusion of the left and the lack of 
meaningful policy-based competition results in low levels of congruence. Likewise, the two 
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parties that have jointly dominated politics in Venezuela little in terms of ideology, and they 
clearly do not mirror the preferences of their electorates. Although new left-wing parties have 
to some degree filled the ideological void, they have not been able to halt the erosion of the 
party system, ultimately paving the way for Chávez’ assault on political parties and 
democratic institutions more generally. Contrary to Colombia and Venezuela’s highly stable 
party systems, electoral vehicles came and went in Peru, with the notable exception of APRA. 
Peru is the only country without a clear ideological divide in the party system. Apart from 
making clientelism pervasive, this seems to have ebbed the way for Fujimori’s charismatic 
mobilization, representing yet another alternative to programmatic linkages. Finally, although 
the case of Mexico from today’s perspective seems to indicate that political agency can 
overcome historical patterns, this is a long-term process, since my results show that the parties 
were by no means representative of voter preferences in the mid-1990s. To move beyond the 
snapshot provided by this paper, and in order to assess the stability of the country differences 
put in evidence, the analysis therefore needs to be extended to more recent electoral periods.  
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Table A1: Operationalization of Issue Categories at the Elite Level (based on PELA surveys) 
 
 
p42 Should state-owned industries be privatized? (1) 
p43 Should public services be privatized? (1) 
p35a01 Desired degree of state intervention: Price control (2) 
p35a04 Desired degree of state intervention: Guarantee jobs (2) 
Economic 
liberalism 
p35a03 Desired degree of state intervention: Provide housing 
p35a06 Desired degree of state intervention: Social insurance for all 
P35a08 Desired degree of state intervention: Unemployment benefits 
P35a10 Desired degree of state intervention: Cover all citizens’ basic needs 
p35a02 Desired degree of state intervention: Primary education 
p35a05 Desired degree of state intervention: Secondary education 
p35a05 Desired degree of state intervention: University education 
Education (3) 
Welfare 
p35a09 Desired degree of state intervention: Protecting the environment Environmental 
protection 
p73 Opinion concerning divorce: in favor or opposed 
p74 Opinion concerning abortion: in favor or opposed 
Cultural liberalism 
p30a Assessment of role of military during recent dictatorship (only in those countries 
that experienced military dictatorships) 
Regime 
p32a01 Agreement: Army guarantees a sovereign state  
p32a02 Agreement: The army’s budget should be reduced  
p32a03 Agreement : The army’s functions should be transferred to the police 
p32a04 Agreement : The army should be a force of national development 
p31a Assessment of the military’s role today 
Army (4) 
 
Note on missing values: After a test of the dimensionality of the items assigned to each category, missing values were imputed for each item 
based on the other items from the same category (or sub-category, if the items proved to be more-dimensional). 
 
Footnotes: 
(1) Privatization forms a separate dimension in some countries (see Table 1). In these cases, economic liberalism and privatization were 
included as separate categories in the discriminant analyses. 
(2) In Uruguay, these items prove strongly related to the items measuring welfare attitudes, and are therefore included to form the welfare 
category. 
(3) Because they are very similar in content and highly correlated, the items pertaining to education are first combined into an index using 
factor analysis. The education index is then used together with the other items to operationalize the welfare category.  
(4) The items measuring positions regarding the army often produced two-dimensional solutions (see Table 1). In these cases, the two 
components were included as separate categories in the discriminant analyses. 
 
Table A2: Operationalization of Issue Categories at the Voter Level (based on WVS) 
 
v126 Private vs. public ownership? 
v128 Competition: good or harmful? 
v1330 Import foreign goods vs. protectionism 
Economic 
liberalism 
v125 Should incomes be made more equal? 
v127 Government responsibility that everyone is provided for? 
Welfare 
v41 Growth vs. environmental protection 
v38 Increase taxes to protect the environment? 
Environmental 
protection 
v1990 Opinion concerning abortion: justifiable? 
v2001 Opinion concerning divorce: justifiable 
Cultural liberalism 
v151 Assessment of role of military during recent dictatorship (only in those countries 
that experienced military dictatorships) 
v154 Good or bad to have a strong leader who does not have to care about congress 
and elections? 
v156 Good or bad to have the army rule? 
v157  Good or bad to have a democratic system? 
v159 Priority: Maintain order or respect individual freedom? 
v161 Agree or disagree: Too much squabbling in democracy 
v163 Agree or disagree: Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best form of 
government 
Regime (1) 
 
Note on missing values: After a test of the dimensionality of the items assigned to each category, missing values were imputed for each item 
based on the other items from the same category (or sub-category, if the items proved to be more than one-dimensional). 
 
(1) Attitudes regarding political regime are frequently more than one-dimensional. This information can be found in Tables 1 and A2. 
